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Abstract:   
We study how countries can coordinate their national action plans so as to fight global 
child trafficking. As both the demand and supply of trafficked children are transboundary 
in scope, international cooperation may be necessary to mitigate cross-country 
externalities. We show that specialization is the main feature of international 
cooperation. We also show that the pattern of specialization depends only on the level of 
economic development of state-parties. In particular, specialization leads to asymmetric 
national action plans when state-parties have different levels of economic development: 
the governments of poorer countries specialize on fighting the supply of trafficked 
children from their territories, while the governments of richer countries specialize on 
fighting the demand arising within their territories. 
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1. Introduction
This paper explores the fundamental principles of a successful international coordi-
nation of national action plans aimed at curbing global child traﬃcking. Children are
traﬃcked within and across borders in almost all countries, although children from Africa,
Latin America, and South Asia are over-represented among the victims (UNICEF-IRC
2009). Exploitation of traﬃcking victims ranges from involvement in hazardous labor,
sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, street begging, to criminal activities (UNICEF-
IRC 2008). As in the case of most criminal activities, concrete data on child traﬃcking
are unavailable, but estimates do exist. For example, in 2002, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) estimated that 1.2 million children are traﬃcked worldwide for the
purpose of labor or sexual exploitation each year (UNICEF-IRC 2008). In its 2004 Traf-
ﬁcking in Persons Report covering the years 2004 to 2006, the US state Department
estimated that every year 600,000 to 800,000 people are traﬃcked across international
borders worldwide, including children. These ﬁgures suggest that child traﬃcking has
become a global business, raising major concerns among national governments and the
international community at large.
Global concern for child traﬃcking is ﬁrmly articulated in the United Nation’s Palermo
Protocol. As a supplement to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Orga-
nized Crime, the Palermo Protocol aims to (a) prevent and combat traﬃcking in persons,
paying particular attention to women and children; (b) protect and assist the victims of
such traﬃcking, with full respect for their human rights; and (c) promote cooperation
among states parties in order to meet those objectives. 1 However, ratiﬁcation of this
instrument of international cooperation is not universal; implementation is patchy; and
lack of action to implement it remains a problem (UN-GIFT 2008). What is more, the
reported complexity of the child traﬃcking business continues to impair practitioners’
knowledge of what may work and what may not in getting states parties to cooperate
eﬀectively for the elimination of this phenomenon.
Conceptually, child traﬃcking can be construed as involving two separate economic
operations. On one hand, there are operations involving the targeting of vulnerable chil-
dren in a given state or region for abduction or recruitment and their illegal transportation
to trading points within or across the border–upstream operations. We interpret these op-
erations as supply-creating. On the other hand, there are operations involving the illegal
adoption of unscrupulous production practices involving labor exploitation, which cre-
1. See United Nation (2000)’ Palermo Protocol, available at
http://www.segretariatosociale.rai.it/INGLESE/codici/tratta_esseri_umani/protocol_ing.pdf
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ate a demand for traﬃcked children whose labor is then exploited for proﬁt–downstream
operations. At a country level, a comprehensive national action plan may therefore in-
volve ﬁghting child traﬃcking on two battlefronts: an upstream (or supply) front where
public action can aim to spread a safety net under potentially vulnerable children, and
a downstream (or demand) front where such action can ﬁght exploitation of children,
for example by inspecting workplaces for illegal production practices intensive the use
of traﬃcked children. Pressing questions thus arise: Are there gains from specialization
among state parties involved in the global ﬁght against child traﬃcking? If so, what is the
pattern of this specialization? In other words, should all state parties do the same thing
irrespective of their structural characteristics (richer or poorer)? These are the questions
we address in this paper.
We develop a two-country model of child protection against child traﬃcking, high-
lighting two battlefronts against child traﬃcking. In the upstream front, the ﬁrst line of
defense consists of parental investment in child protection against vulnerability to traf-
ﬁcking. Success at this level tracks parental wealth. Vulnerable children are therefore
those whose parents cannot aﬀord to allocate household resources to child protection.
This creates an incentive for the government to join the battle on this front, at least on
equity grounds. Furthermore, if the demand for traﬃcked children were predominantly
domestic, it would have been possible for the government to attack the demand as well.
However, when child traﬃcking is transboundary, attacking demand may be ineﬀective,
without the cooperation of the governments of foreign states. Moreover, even if the gov-
ernment ends up focusing exclusively on supply, how eﬀective this policy will be is itself
inﬂuenced both by the relative level of economic development of other countries and
the actions of the governments of these countries. International coordination of states’
national action plans may thus be necessary to mitigate this negative externality, and
restore eﬃciency.
In our model, the object of international cooperation is therefore the prescription of
the share of public funds the government of each country is to allocate to each of the
two battlefronts. The goal of this international cooperation is construed as the minimiza-
tion of the global incidence of child traﬃcking. To solve this minimization problem, we
follow a two-step strategy. First, we characterize a global market equilibrium, which we
deﬁne as the relative price that clears the global child traﬃcking market. This price is
the link between upstream and downstream operations, and thus represents the mecha-
nism through which cross-country externalities impact the eﬀectiveness of each country’s
national action plan against child traﬃcking. Indeed, we show that, in each state, the
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equilibrium incidence of child traﬃcking is inﬂuenced by own-state policy actions as well
as by foreign states’ policy actions. In other words, policy actions in one state generate
an externality (positive or negative) in the incidence of child traﬃcking in another state.
Second, we characterize the global incidence of child traﬃcking as the outcome of a
cooperative equilibrium deﬁned as the policy actions’ pair that minimizes the global in-
cidence of child traﬃcking. We derive the properties of the cooperative equilibrium thus
deﬁned by solving the model numerically. In doing so, we distinguish between two case-
scenarios. In one, parental and government actions in the upstream front are strategic
substitutes, while in the other, there are strategic complements. In each case-scenario, we
discuss international cooperation both between structurally similar states, and between
structurally diﬀerent states.
We show that specialization is the main feature of international cooperation. We
also show that the pattern of specialization depend only on the level of economic de-
velopment of state-parties. In particular, specialization leads to asymmetric national
action plans when state-parties have diﬀerent levels of economic development. The gov-
ernments of poorer states should focus on ﬁghting the supply of traﬃcked children from
their territories, while richer countries should focus on ﬁghting the demand for traﬃcked
children within their territories. The underlying intuition is quite straightforward: the
supply of traﬃcked children is higher, the poorer the economy while the demand for traf-
ﬁcked children is higher, the richer the economy. To the extent that child traﬃcking is a
transboundary phenomenon, the high incidence of child vulnerability to traﬃcking in the
poorer country generates a negative externality in the ﬁght against demand in the richer
country while the high demand for traﬃcked children in the richer country generates a
negative externality in the ﬁght against supply in the poorer country. Therefore, inter-
national cooperation best internalizes these cross-country externalities by mandating a
pattern of complete specialization whereby the poorer country attacks the supply while
the richer country attacks the demand.
Interestingly, when the economies of state parties are structurally similar, there may
be multiple specialization proﬁles if both of them are suﬃciently rich: each state can spe-
cialize its attack either on the supply-side (with the other doing the opposite) or on the
demand-side (with the other doing the opposite). Cooperation yields symmetric national
actions plans only when state-parties are equally poor. We also show that whether or
not parental and government actions in the upstream front are strategic complements
does not aﬀect the patterns of specialization across state-parties, although it expectedly
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leads to diﬀerent incidences of child traﬃcking globally.
To the best of our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst to directly address the issue
of international coordination of national action plans against child traﬃcking, although
general contributions to the child traﬃcking literature exist. For example, Dessy and
Pallage (2005) analyze the determinants of children participation in the worst forms of
child labor, and study their implications for the ratiﬁcation of ILO Convention 182 on
the worst forms of child labor. Rogers and Swinnerton (2008) analyze the welfare eﬀects
of combating exploitative child labor, in a context where poor and vulnerable families
get tricked by unscrupulous entrepreneurs into releasing custody of their oﬀspring in ex-
change for the often unfulﬁlled promise of a better future for these children. Each of these
two previous models could be reinterpreted as a child traﬃcking model on its own right.
However, it is not clear what their implications for international cooperation would be.
Our contribution to this literature is thus to uncover the pillars of an eﬃcient interna-
tional cooperation in the global ﬁght against child traﬃcking.
Our study also contributes to the literature on international cooperation and agree-
ments (Barret 2001 and 2003; Boucher and Bramoullé 2010). Barrett (2001) investigates
the size of a self-enforcing international environmental agreement and highlight asymme-
tries among countries as a key factor to self-enforcing agreements. Boucher and Bramoullé
(2010) extend the model in Barret (2003) to investigate the impact uncertainty and risk
aversion have on international agreements to supply global public goods. All these exist-
ing studies are primarily concerned with international cooperation for the production of
global public goods (or public bads) with application to environmental economics. We
contribute to this literature by focusing on international cooperation to combat child
traﬃcking–a trans-boundary phenomenon. We follow Barret (2001) by distinguishing
between symmetric state parties and asymmetric state parties in the exploration of the
pillars of an eﬃcient international coordination of national action plans against child
traﬃcking.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the environment,
highlighting the coexistence of within-state child traﬃcking alongside its cross-border
component. Section 3 discuss international cooperation when parental and government
actions in the upstream front are strategic substitutes. Section 4 then extend the dis-
cussion to the case where parental and government actions in the upstream front are
strategic complements. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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2. The Setup
Consider a world consisting of two states denoted A and B, respectively. Each state
is populated by a continuum one of households. Initially, a household includes an adult
decision-maker and his unique child. In each state, households initially diﬀer only with
respect to their endowment k of capital, which is drawn from a compact set,

0; ki

,
where 0 < ki < 1 in each state i (i = A;B), according to a cumulative density func-
tion, 	i, with strictly positive density  i (k) = 	0i (k), where 0 < ki < 1 in each state
i (i = A;B). The cumulative density function (cdf) 	0i and the boundary elements ki
(i = A;B) may diﬀer across states, so as to obtain per capita income diﬀerences across
these states.
Cross-border child traﬃcking is the only trade link between the twostates, which
otherwise are closed economies. In each state, a non-traded ﬁnal good is produced. Adults
in each state all work for ﬁrms producing the non-traded good. The market for traﬃcked
children is international in scope, and thus allows for cross-border child traﬃcking for
exploitation. In all markets, ﬁrms exhibit a price-taking behavior. Child traﬃcking
consists of two types of operations, upstream and downstream operations. Because of
opportunities for cross-border traﬃcking, our model highlights state-interdependencies
with respect to the determinants of the incidence of child traﬃcking and discusses policy
coordination between the two states.
2.1. Household’s problem
In each state i (i = A;B), a household-head (from here on, the parent) has preferences
over own-consumption of the non-traded good, and over the safety of her unique child.
The realized utility of a representative parent in state i is given as follows:
U(c) = (1  I) c;  2 (0; 1) (1)
where  is a measure of the disutility incurred by a parent if and when she loses her
child to traﬃckers 2, c, the quantity he or she consumes of the non-traded good, and
I 2 f0; 1g, her realized status. A parent with status I = 0 enjoys custody of his or her
child, while a parent with status I = 1 lost her child to traﬃckers and thus incurs a level
of disutility equal to c.
2. Obviously, this feature of parental preferences suggests that the level of disutility from the lost
of a child is identical for all households, and all countries. While this may not necessarily be a feature
of the reality, we abstract away from this complexity so as to keep the focus on the implications of
cross-country interpendencies in child traﬃcking outcomes for eﬃcient international cooperation against
child traﬃcking.
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In each state i and in every household, the parent is a factor supplier who sells labor
to ﬁrms in exchange for a wage, !i, and rents her capital endowment, k, to ﬁrms at a
rental rate ri. Given her income, she decides how much to consume of the non-traded
good. At the same time, she decides whether or not to provide adequate protection to her
unique child to shield the child against unscrupulous child traﬃckers. Assume it takes
a quantity  of the numeraire good to fully protect the child from becoming vulnerable
to traﬃcking. One can think of  as the level of resources needed to provide a child
with adequate care–including adequate nutrition, lodging, and schooling. The parent’s
decision on child protection is thus a binary variable x that takes the value x = 1 if the
parent elects to expend private resources in order to aﬀord her oﬀspring with adequate
protection, and x = 0 if she elects not to.
With this speciﬁcation of the parent’s child protection decision, we can next charac-
terize the parent’s realized status as follows: I =   (x), such that
  (x) =
(
0 if x = 1
I0 if x = 0
(2)
where I0 denotes a random variable described as follows:
I0 =
(
0 with prob. 1  i
1 with prob. i
(3)
In other words, i is the conditional probability that a child left unprotected (i.e., x = 0)
falls victim to traﬃckers.
If we denote as ni the total number of vulnerable children in state i, and by niu 2
[0; ni], its total number of child traﬃcking victims, then the conditional probability, i,
can be described as follows:
i =
niu
ni
; (4)
all i, i = A;B.
A household with net income !i + riki   Ti faces the following budget constraint:
c+ x  !i + riki   Ti for all i, (5)
where Ti 2 (0; 1) denotes the level of the lump sum tax levied by the government of state
i on all households. Given our normalization of the population size in each state, Ti is
also total tax revenue available to the government in state i. As the utility function is
strictly increasing, the representative parent’s expected utility maximization problem can
be stated as follows:
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max
hxi
[1    (x)] (!i + riki   Ti   x) ; (6)
which is obtained by substituting (5) into (1).
2.2. Optimal Household Decision on Child Protection
For each state i, consider a parent’s decision on whether or not to expend a level
of resources  to aﬀord her oﬀspring with adequate protection against child traﬃckers.
Using (3), we can write the expected utility of a parent who makes the decision x as
follows:
V (x; ki; !i; ri; i; Ti) =
(
!i + riki   Ti    if x = 1
(1  i) (!i + riki   Ti) if x = 0
: (7)
We then write the net expected utility gain from choosing to protect the child (i.e.,
x = 1) as follows:
# (ki; !i; ri; i; Ti)  V (1; ki; !i; ri; i; Ti)  V (0; ki; !i; ri; i; Ti)
When i > 0, expression (7) can be used to obtain the following parametric speciﬁca-
tion of the parent’s net utility gain from investing in child protection against traﬃckers:
# (ki; !i; ri; i; Ti) = i (!i + riki   Ti)  : (8)
Arguably, it is optimal for a parent with a level of wealth, k, in state i, to invest in
child protection against traﬃckers if and only if:
# (k; !i; ri; i; Ti) > 0: (9)
Observe from (8) that in an environment where there is no risk of child traﬃcking
(i.e., i = 0) it is never optimal for a parent to invest in child protection: if i = 0, then
# (ki; !i; ri; i; Ti) < 0. Since
@# (ki; !i; ri; i; Ti)
@ki
> 0;
whenever i > 0, only poverty can prevent altruistic parents from investing in child pro-
tection.
It can thus be shown that there exists a threshold parental wealth level, ki , such that
for all parents with levels of wealth ki such that ki > ki , x = 1 is optimal while for all
those with levels of wealth such that ki < ki , choosing x = 0 is optimal instead, where
8
ki =
1
ri

(i)
 1  + Ti   !i

(10)
all i 2 fA;Bg. In other words, the threshold, ki , divides the population of state i’s
parents between non-investors — in total number 	i (ki ), — and investors — in total
number 1 	i (ki ).
2.3. Child’s Vulnerability to Traﬃcking
Vulnerability factors associated with child traﬃcking are often tied to such child pro-
tection concerns as child discrimination based on gender, dysfunctional families, violence,
and abuse in the community, at home, and a lack of livelihood opportunities for children
(UNICEF’s IRC Report 2009). While all these factors matter for child vulnerability to
traﬃcking, both common sense and empirical evidence, however, point to poverty either
at the family, community, or country level as the foundation of most these concerns.
For example, in general, a parent with enough resources to go around may have little
incentive to discriminate between her children; and even if she does, the resulting eﬀect
on the discriminated child vulnerability is likely to be small compared to what it would
have been had the parent been poorer. Likewise, a family that lives in a community
characterized by child abuse and violence may not stick around if it can aﬀord to move
to a safer community to aﬀord its children more protection. Thus only poverty can pre-
vent this family from either protecting its oﬀspring in this community or moving to a
safer community. This justiﬁes why we model child’s vulnerability to traﬃcking as being
rooted in poverty (as determined by !i; ri; ki).
A child vulnerability to traﬃcking can take several forms. But what we have in mind
is a traﬃcking process whereby a child with no adequate family support has to fend for
herself, in which case she is likely to fall victim to unscrupulous traﬃckers who may then
abduct and transport her to trading points either domestically (within-state child traf-
ﬁcking) or in a foreign state (cross-border child traﬃcking).
Next, consider the total number of children vulnerable to traﬃcking, ni 2 [0; 1].
Given our normalization of the household size, we know that the cardinality of the set of
households unable to invest  in child protection is identical to the number of vulnerable
children in the state. Therefore, we have that
ni = 	(k

i ) (11)
where ki is as deﬁned in (10). Indeed from (10) it follows that factors accounting for
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cross-country diﬀerences in child’s vulnerability to traﬃcking include ri; i; !i, and Ti.
The following proposition therefore summarizes our sensitivity analysis with respect to
the determinants of child vulnerability.
Proposition 1. Parents tend to invest less in child protection when the risk of child
traﬃcking, i, is lower, and they are poorer, in the sense of having a lower net income
as determined by ri, !i, and Ti.
Observe that i, !i; and ri all are endogenous, and thus represent potential vehicles
of cross-border eﬀects on the domestic incidence of child vulnerability to traﬃcking.
Therefore to gain a more complete understanding of the determinants of the number
of vulnerable children in state i, we must ﬁrst compute the equilibrium levels of i, !i,
and ri. This will require a characterization of a general equilibrium for this two-state
economy. The next steps take us toward this objective. From this point on, upstream
variables are indexed by u while downstream ones are indexed by d.
2.4. Child Traﬃcking: Upstream Operations
Recall that upstream operations in child traﬃcking include the recruiting and trans-
porting of vulnerable children to trading points, where victims will be oﬀered to private
ﬁrms for exploitation, in exchange for a traﬃcking fee. We are not particularly interested
in the individual identity of those performing these operations, but rather in the determi-
nants of the viability of these operations. Therefore, we assume without loss of generality
that upstream operations are carried out by perfectly competitive ﬁrms using capital
only. This assumption is based upon ample evidence that capital is very important in
the transporting and harboring of traﬃcking victims. More speciﬁcally, aircraft, boat,
rail, ferry and automobiles may be used to take victims to the country of destination
(UN-GIFT 2008). Capital may also be important for forgery of documents, and acts of
coercion against the victims (guns, chains, etc.).
On the upstream battlefront, therefore, the representative ﬁrm uses capital, Kiu, to
snatch away vulnerable children while the government invests a level of public funds, giu,
to shield or rescue these children. The outcome of this battle between the representative
ﬁrm and the government is reﬂected in the relative share,  (giu; ni; Kiu), of vulnerable
children that traﬃckers are able to snatch away. Thus, the representative ﬁrm’s output,
niu, which is the total number of traﬃcking victims, can be described as follows:
niu =  (giu; ni; Kiu) ni; all i 2 fA;Bg ; (12)
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all i, where  (giu; ni; Kiu) denotes the proportion of vulnerable children who eﬀectively
fall victim to traﬃckers. The function  (:) reﬂects the productivity of the traﬃcking tech-
nology used, where Kiu is the level of capital used by the representative child traﬃcker.
We make the following assumption:
A.1. The function  (:) is given as follows:
 (giu; ni; Kiu) =
"un
&
iKiu
1 + giu
(13)
where & 2 [ 1; 1], and "u is a positive parameter.
Observe that using (4) and (12), we can write the conditional probability that a
vulnerable child falls victim to traﬃckers as follows:
i =  (giu; ni; Kiu) ;
all i. As an implication, we obtain the probability that a vulnerable child avoid falling
into the traﬃckers’ net as follows:
i = 1   (giu; ni; Kiu) ;
with i + i = 1. Therefore, using (13), we obtain the following cross-partial derivative:
@2i
@giu@ni
=
&"uKiu
(1 + giu)
2 n1 &i
: (14)
An increase in giu corresponds to an increase in the level of public investment in
child protection against upstream traﬃcking operations. By comparison, a decrease in
ni corresponds to an increase in the number of parents who invest in child protection
against vulnerability to traﬃcking. An important question thus is: how does public
investment and parental investment interact in the ﬁght against upstream child traﬃcking
operations? Using (14), we can easily show that the answer to this question clearly
depends on &. We then obtain the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1. Parental investment and public investment are strategic substitutes in the
ﬁght against upstream child traﬃcking operations if and only if &  0, and are strategic
complements if and only if & < 0 .
Indeed, when & > 0 (respectively, & < 0), expression (14) is positive (respectively, neg-
ative), which correspond to strategic substitutability (respectively, complementarity) in
this case. To close our discussion of upstream child traﬃcking operations, we characterize
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the zero-proﬁt condition implied by perfect competition. Letting p denote the price at
which a traﬃcking victim is traded to ﬁrms in downstream operations, we can write the
representative upstream ﬁrm’s proﬁt as follows:
iu = pniu   riuKiu; (15)
all i. Substituting (12) and (13) in (15), re-arranging, yields this proﬁt function as follows:
iu =

p"un
1+&
i
1 + giu
  riu

Kiu; (16)
all i, where riu denotes the rental rate charged to the representative ﬁrm for capital rented.
Since capital is the only input into child traﬃcking operations, perfect competition erases
all proﬁt: iu = 0, i. It can then be shown that the zero-proﬁt condition holds if and
only if :
riu =
p"un
1+&
i
1 + giu
(17)
all i.
2.5. Child Traﬃcking: Downstream Operations
We model downstream child traﬃcking operations as involving the exploitation of
traﬃcking victims’ labor in the production process of the non-traded good. This mod-
eling strategy is supported by the evidence that unscrupulous employers who generate a
demand for traﬃcked children are a signiﬁcant element in the traﬃcking chain and are
considered traﬃckers, because they have received traﬃcked children and thus conform
to the Palermo Protocol ’s deﬁnition of traﬃcking (ILO-IPEC 2009). Forced labor —also
known as modern-day slavery— is a good example of the traﬃcked children’s involve-
ment in productive activities. However, as children are not necessarily the productive
equals of adults, we convert a child productivity in the non-traded good sector to its
adult equivalent, as in Basu and Van (1998). Therefore in each state i, we model the
aggregate production function for the non-traded good as exhibiting constant return to
scale to capital, Kid, and eﬃciency units of labor, Hid:
Yid = K

idH
1 
id ; 0 <  < 1; (18)
where
Hid = Lid + inid; (19)
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Lid denotes the number of hired adults, nid, the number of traﬃcked children exploited
by the representative ﬁrm, and i  0, the adult-equivalent of an exploited child’s labor
productivity.
The direct cost to the representative ﬁrm of exploiting traﬃcked children thus is pnid,
which is deducted from the ﬁrm’s revenue. In each state i therefore, the representative
ﬁrm in the non-traded good sector solves the following problem: 3
max
hKid;Lidi

KidH
1 
id   ridKid   !iLid   pnid
	
: (20)
Resource constraints in state i are given as follows:
Kid +Kiu 
Z ki
0
ki (ki) dki = eki (21)
Lid  1: (22)
As traﬃcked children are the only "good" traded between the two states, the trade-
balance condition for traﬃcked children isX
i=A;B
nid =
X
i=A;B
niu: (23)
Proﬁt-maximization by the representative ﬁrm leads to the following factor pricing
rules under market-clearing:
!i = (1  )
 eki  Kiu
1 + inid
!
(24)
rid = 
 eki  Kiu
1 + inid
! 1
(25)
p = i (1  )
 eki  Kiu
1 + inid
!
(26)
all i.
2.6. National Action Plan against Child Traﬃcking
In each state i, the national action plan against child traﬃcking involves a two-
battlefront attack on child traﬃcking. Because of cross-border traﬃcking, child vul-
nerability to traﬃcking in any given state can become an international concern, calling
3. The proﬁt function in (20) does not include expenditures on traﬃcked children’s maintenance,
including food and clothing. While adding these maintenance costs would increase our model’s connection
to reality, it would not, however, bring any qualitative improvement to our results.
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for cooperation among the states as an eﬀective strategy for curbing child traﬃcking and
exploitation.
In each state i, we assume a proportion, i 2 [0; 1], of the tax revenue collected is allo-
cated to ﬁghting child traﬃcking on the upstream front while the remaining proportion,
1  i, is allocated to ﬁghting it on the downstream front.
Fighting upstream child traﬃcking operations can take various forms including target-
ing vulnerable families for conditional cash transfer or building schools within vulnerable
communities so as to limit the risk factors that contribute to vulnerable children being
easily lured by unscrupulous entrepreneurs. Prevention of child traﬃcking can also take
the form of implementation of a legislation mandating the registration, licensing and
monitoring of recruitment agencies, temporary human resource bureaus and other agents
involved in recruiting, organizing and facilitating labor migration (ILO-IPEC 2009). To
the extent that the government is subject to a balanced budget legislation, the level of
public funds allocated to the upstream battlefront against child traﬃcking thus is:
giu = iTi; (27)
where Ti is total tax revenue in state i, all i.
On the downstream front, public action to ﬁght child exploitation is based upon the
recognition that identifying exploitative employers and bringing them to justice is an
important tool for curbing the demand for traﬃcked children. This may occur through
workplace inspectors who identify cases of child labor/child traﬃcking and use the power
of labor laws to bring exploiters to justice. Such public action thus may aﬀect guilty
ﬁrms through a reduction in the level of child productivity. For instance, depending
on the frequency with which government oﬃcials inspect workplaces, unscrupulous ﬁrm
managers may be forced to reduce the number of hours worked by their victims, so
as to avoid detection by government inspectors, thus leading to a decline in children’s
productivity. In other words, the outcome of the battle between the government of state
i and exploitative ﬁrms is reﬂected in the level of the child productivity parameter, i.
More formally,
i =
"d
1 + gid
; (28)
where "d > 0, and
gid = (1  i)Ti: (29)
The term "d is assumed to be identical in both states, as is "u. For the sake of
simplicity and to keep the focus of international coordination of anti-child traﬃcking
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policies, we also abstract away from the political economy of taxation in each state by
making the following assumption:
A.2. Given the vector of structural fundamentals of each state,
 
ki;	
i

, and for all i =
A;B, the lump sum tax ﬁnancing the ﬁght against child traﬃcking and exploitation,
Ti, is given by
Ti = k

i ; ;  > 0: (30)
Next, we characterize a market equilibrium for the two-State global economy.
3. Market Equilibrium
In this section we characterize, for each State i, the incidence of child vulnerability to
traﬃcking, the supply of, as well as the demand for, traﬃcked children.
3.1. Incidence of Child Vulnerability to Traﬃcking
In each state i, child-traﬃcking and the production of the non-traded good are com-
peting claims for capital use. Since capital is perfectly mobile across these two sectors,
rental rates equalization is clearly a feature of the market equilibrium in each state:
riu = rid; (31)
all i (i = A;B). We use this rental rates equalization condition to establish the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose that for all i,
	i (k) =
k
ki
; (32)
and
p+ (1 + giu)
1
1+& p kiai   iTi > 0: (33)
Then,
(i) the equilibrium number of vulnerable children in state i is given by ni  N
 
i; ki; p

,
with
N
 
i; ki; p

=
"
 (1 + giu) [(1  )i]
1 

"up
1

# 1
1+&
; (34)
and
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(ii) the conditional probability that a vulnerable child falls victim to traﬃckers is i 
%
 
i; ki; p

, with
%
 
i; ki; p

=
i
p+ (1 + giu)
1
1+& p kiai   iTi
(35)
where
 =
1 + (1  ) (1 + &)
(1 + &) 
(36)
ai =

" 1u 
2+&
 1
1+& [(1  )]
(1 )(2+&)
(1+&) 
2+& 
(1+&)
i (37)
 = =: (38)
Proof. The proof follows in several steps. First, from (31), substituting in (17) and (25)
yields:
p"un
1+&
i
1 + giu
= 

Kid
1 + inid
 1
(39)
Solving the equation (39) using the capital availability constraint yields the follow-
ing relative factor intensity in downstream production operations:
eki  Kiu
1 + inid
=

(1 + giu) 
p"un
1+&
i
 1
1 
: (40)
Substituting (40) in (24) and (26), rearranging, yields
!i = (1  )

(1 + giu) 
p"un
1+&
i
 
1 
(41)
p = i (1  )

(1 + giu) 
p"un
1+&
i
 
1 
: (42)
Next, solving (42) for ni given (i; p) yields
ni =

" 1u  (1 + giu)
 1
1+& [(1  )i]
1 
(1+&) p 
1
(1+&) (43)
or
"upn
1+&
i =

(1  )i
p
 1 

(1 + giu) : (44)
This establishes part (i) of Proposition 2.
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To establish part (ii), consider (17) and (41). Substituting in (44), rearranging, yields:
!i = 
 1
i p (45)
ri = 

(1  )i
p
 1 

: (46)
Finally substituting (45) and (46) into (10), again rearranging, yields
ki =
1


p
(1  )i
 1 
 
(i)
 1  + Ti    1i p

: (47)
Next, we compute the conditional probability, i, that a vulnerable child falls victim
to traﬃckers. First, by deﬁnition, the incidence of child vulnerability to traﬃcking
in State i is ni = 	(ki ). Second, from (43), we have that
ni = 	
i
 
1


p
(1  )i
 1 
 
(i)
 1  + Ti    1i p
!
: (48)
Finally, combining (32), (43) and (48), rearranging, yields the following equation:
(i)
 1 i + iTi   p = kiai (1 + giu)
1
1+& p ;
where
 =
1 + (1  ) (1 + &)
(1 + &) 
ai =

" 1u 
2+&
 1
1+& [(1  )]
(1 )(2+&)
(1+&) 
2+& 
(1+&)
i
Solving this equation for i then yields the result. This completes the proof.
Proposition 2 is established in the context of a uniform probability distribution of
agents across wealth levels in each state. This is purely a simplifying assumption, made
without loss of generality. A number of important remarks can be derived from Proposi-
tion 2 through partial diﬀerentiation of (34) and (35) respectively:
Remark 1. In any state i, when ﬁnanced by an income tax, public investment aimed
at mitigating upstream child traﬃcking operations tends to (i) increase the number of
vulnerable children (i.e., @ni=@giu > 0 ) and (ii) decrease the conditional probability that
a vulnerable child will fall victim to traﬃckers (i.e., @i=@giu < 0).
The above remark is consistent with the well-documented fact that when ﬁnanced by
an income tax, public policy always has a trade-oﬀ: it corrects one problem by creating
another. Its success therefore depends on how high or low this trade-oﬀ is.
17
Remark 2. For a vulnerable child, the likelihood of falling victim to traﬃckers is lower
the wealthier the country: @i=@ki < 0.
The intuition underlying this result is quite straightforward, and can be derived using
expressions (12), (13), and (17). First, observe that since by deﬁnition the likelihood of
falling victim to traﬃckers is i = niu=ni, from (12), we have that i =  (giu; ni; Kiu),
which, using (13) can be shown to be equal to
i =
"un
&
iKiu
1 + giu
(49)
Second, since ni = 	(ki ), it follows from (32) that @ni=@ki < 0, implying that
wealthier countries unsurprisingly have a lower incidence of child vulnerability to traf-
ﬁcking than poorer countries. Third, from (17), @ni=@ki < 0 implies that @ri=@ki < 0.
In other words, the return to capital in upstream child traﬃcking operations is lower
in wealthier, than in poorer, countries. Therefore, upstream child traﬃcking operations
taking place in wealthier countries will attract less capital than those taking place in
poorer countries: @Kiu=@ki < 0. It therefore follows that the likelihood of falling victim
to traﬃckers is lower in wealthier, than in poorer, countries: @i=@ki < 0.
Next, taking the partial derivative of (35) with respect to p yields
@i
@p
=  
i
h
p(1+)    (1 + giu)
1
1+& aiki
i
h
p+ (1 + giu)
1
1+& p kiai   iTi
i2
p(1+)
:
Given , and for ki suﬃciently large, the following inequality can easily obtain:
p1+    (1 + giu)
1
1+& aiki < 0; (50)
all i. Therefore, @i=@p > 0:
Remark 3. If in each state i condition (50) is satisﬁed, then an increase in the market
price of a traﬃcked child raises the conditional probability that a vulnerable child will be
traﬃcked: @i=@p > 0.
The intuition underlying this remark is quite straightforward. A higher price signals
that child traﬃcking is a very lucrative business, which then attracts more capital into
upstream child traﬃcking operations, thus leading to a higher likelihood that a vulnerable
child will fall victim to traﬃckers.
18
3.2. Incidence of Child Traﬃcking
In this sub-section, we compute the incidence of child traﬃcking in each state. By
the application of the law of large numbers, this incidence is given by niu = ini, where
i denotes the conditional probability that a vulnerable child falls victim to traﬃckers.
From Proposition 2, it therefore follows that niu  N o
 
i; ki; p

, with
N o
 
i; ki; p

=
i (1 + giu)
1
1+& p 
1
(1+&)
p+ (1 + giu)
1
1+& p kiai   iTi
; (51)
where
i =
 
" 1u 
 1
1+& (1  ) 1 (1+&) 
1+&
(1+&)
i
:
A number of important observations can be derived from (51):
Remark 4. The incidence of child traﬃcking is always lower the wealthier the country:
@niu=@ki < 0.
The underlying intuition is quite straightforward. The incidence of child vulnerability
to traﬃcking is smaller in wealthier countries because more families can aﬀord to protect
their children against vulnerability to traﬃcking. A lower incidence of child vulnerability
in turn lower the return to capital in upstream child traﬃcking operations, thus driving
capital away. As capital is key to the intensity of child traﬃcking activity, the result is a
lower incidence of child traﬃcking.
Next, taking the partial derivative of (51) with respect to p, rearranging, yields:
@niu
@p
=
i (1 + giu)  (p)
(1 + &) 
h
p+ (1 + giu)
1
1+& p kiai   iTi
i2 ;
where
 (p) = p 
1


(1 + giu)
1
1+& aikif (&)  p1+ + iTip

1 +  (1 + &)

and
 =
[1 +  (1 + &)]
 (1 + &)
f (&) =
(1  ) (1 + &)
1 +  (1 + &)
:
The term  (p) is strictly positive if
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(1 + giu)
1
1+& aikif (&)  p1+  0: (52)
Therefore, the following Remark is also straightforward:
Remark 5. If in each state i condition (52) is satisﬁed, then an increase in the market
price of a traﬃcked child raises the incidence of child traﬃcking in state i: @niu=@p > 0.
However less straightforward is the eﬀect of an increase in public investment aimed at
combating upstream child traﬃcking operations, giu. Indeed, taking the partial derivative
of (51) with respect to giu; ceteris paribus, yields:
@niu
@giu
=
(p  iTi)ip 
1
h
p+ (1 + giu)
1
1+& p kiai   iTi
i2 :
If
p > iTi;
then @niu=@giu > 0. Only when
p < iTi
will this partial derivative be negative : @niu=@giu < 0. Hence the following Remark:
Remark 6. Attacking upstream child traﬃcking operations is eﬀective at reducing the
incidence of child traﬃcking only when the trading price p is relatively small.
A lower trading price implies that the demand for traﬃcked children is low. This
Remark thus implies that factors that raise the demand for traﬃcked children can make
it hard to ﬁght upstream child traﬃcking operations, while those that lowers it can make
it easier. Hence the need to ﬁght child traﬃcking operations on both fronts. In this
section, we deﬁne key endogenous variables along with the conditions these variables
must satisfy in equilibrium. We begin with factor prices, ri and !i, as these determine
the number of children vulnerable to traﬃcking.
3.3. Equilibrium Price
We are now ready to characterize the equilibrium relative price of a traﬃcked child,
p, given the fundamentals of this two-state global economy, as determined by the level
of wealth of each state (proxied by ki), and its public policy framework (proxied by i,
where i = A;B). To characterize this trading price, p, we ﬁrst must specify the excess
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demand function for traﬃcked children in this international environment.
From (23), we know that
P
i niu denotes the global supply of traﬃcked children andP
i niu, its global demand. Therefore, the global excess demand, 
 
p; A; B; kA; kB

, is
given by

 
p; A; B; kA; kB

=
X
i
nid  
X
i
N o
 
p; i; ki

: (53)
where N o
 
p; i; ki

is as deﬁned in (51).
To complete the characterization of the excess demand function, it remains to compute
nid, for all i:
Proposition 3. The demand for traﬃcked children in state i is given by nid  Nd
 
p; i; ki

:
Nd
 
p; i; ki

=
ki
2
 Ku  i; ki; p (1  )1 i
p
 1
   1i ; (54)
where
Ku
 
p; i; ki

=
"
(1 + giu)
1
& p
1

"
1
&
u [(1  )i]
1 

# &
1+&
%
 
p; i; ki

(55)
and %
 
p; i; ki
  i, all i.
Proof. Consider (40). Substituting in (44), using (32), and rearranging, yields the de-
mand for traﬃcked children as follows in State i:
nid =
ki
2
 Kiu

(1  )1 i
p
 1
   1i ; (56)
all i. Next, from (49), we have that
Kiu =
%
 
p; i; ki

"u
1+giu
n&i
; (57)
Using (34), we have that
"u
1 + giu
n&i =

"u
1 + giu
 1
1+&
"
 [(1  )i]
1 

p
1

# &
1+&
: (58)
Combining (57) and (58) yields
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Kiu  Ku
 
p; i; ki

=
"
(1 + giu)
1
& p
1

"
1
&
u [(1  )i]
1 

# &
1+&
%
 
p; i; ki

:
Hence the result.
Proposition 3 uncovers the determinants of the demand for traﬃcked children in
each State i. In particular, two important remarks can be derived from (54) by way
of diﬀerentiation.
Remark 7. If condition (50) holds, then the demand for traﬃcked children decreases
with an exogenous increase in the market price, p: @nid=@p < 0.
Remark 8. The demand for traﬃcked children is higher the wealthier the country:
@nid=@ki > 0.
The latter remark is consistent with empirical observations showing that the major
routes of transboundary child traﬃcking have poorer countries as the source, and richer
countries as the destination, of traﬃcked children (UNICEF 2008).
On the basis of Proposition 3, we can therefore complete the construction of the global
excess demand function as follows using (53):

 
p; A; B; kA; kB

=
X
i
Nd
 
p; i; ki
 X
i
N o
 
p; i; ki

: (59)
Hence the following Proposition:
Proposition 4. Let condition (52) hold. Then the global excess demand function for
traﬃcked children is a strictly decreasing function of the price, p.
Proof. The result follows from Remarks 5 and 7, noting that condition (52) implies
condition (33).
In this convex environment, Proposition 4 may be suﬃcient to ensure that a global
market equilibrium exists.
Deﬁnition 2. A global market equilibrium is a price p for a traﬃcked child such that
given the state of the world as described by the vector
 
A; B; kA; kB

,

 
p; A; B; kA; kB
  0: (60)
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Let p = P
 
A; B; kA; kB

denote the equilibrium relative price of a traﬃcked child
when the state of nature is characterized by the vector of fundamentals. On the basis
of this equilibrium, we can rewrite the incidence of child traﬃcking in state i as follows
using (51):
niu =
i (1 + giu)
1
1+&

P
 
A; B; kA; kB
  1
(1+&)
P
 
A; B; kA; kB

+ (1 + giu)
1
1+&

P
 
A; B; kA; kB
  kiai   iTi ; (61)
all i.
Then observe from (61) how the incidence of child traﬃcking in state i is aﬀected by
the fundamentals of state j, as determined by the pair
 
j; kj

, i 6= j, with i; j = A;B.
This dependence of the equilibrium incidence of child traﬃcking in state i on both the
level of economic development and policy action in state j implies the existence of cross-
country externalities. Because of these externalities, eﬃciency in the ﬁght against child
traﬃcking can be enhanced by international coordination of national Action plans against
child traﬃcking between states.
3.4. The Global Incidence of Child Traﬃcking
In this subsection, we characterize the determinants of the global incidence of child
traﬃcking. Just to recall, our environment consists of two states, A and B. The structure
of this environment will be said to be symmetric if the two states have the same level
of wealth: kA = kB = k. This environment will be said to exhibit state heterogeneity if
kA 6= kB.
Recall also that we assumed above that there is an international planner who has per-
fect knowledge of each national government’s budget constraint, so that the only object
of international coordination is the vector of shares of public funds allocated to ﬁghting
child traﬃcking on the upstream front, (A; B), where (1  A; 1  B) denotes the cor-
responding vector of shares allocated to ﬁghting child traﬃcking on the downstream front.
We know that the global incidence of child traﬃcking and exploitation,
nt = 
 
A; B; kA; kB

, is the sum total of states’ incidences. Using (61), we know that
this global incidence is given by:
nt =
X
i
24 i (1 + giu) 11+& P  A; B; kA; kB  1(1+&)
P
 
A; B; kA; kB

+ (1 + giu)
1
1+&

P
 
A; B; kA; kB
  kiai   iTi
35 . (62)
23
Therefore the goal of international cooperation is to minimize 
 
A; B; kA; kB

by
the choice of the policy actions’ pair, (A; B), given the fundamentals of the global
economy,
 
kA; kB

. In other words, the cooperative equilibrium provides a prescription
of policy actions by the government of each state-parties, in the form of the vector of
relative shares of public funds allocated to the upstream battle against child traﬃcking,
(A; 

B). This pair of shares is solution to the following minimization problem:
min
hA;Bi

 
A; B; kA; kB

: (63)
For the purpose of this analysis, the questions we are interested in are the following:
What are the properties of the cooperative equilibrium? Does this equilibrium prescribe
that all national action plans against child traﬃcking be symmetric (i.e., A = B)?
In other words should the governments of all countries do the same thing? Or, should
national action plans be asymmetric, with one state focusing more on the upstream front
and the other on the downstream (i.e., A 6= B)? We address these questions in the
following sub-section.
4. International Cooperation
In this section, we characterize a cooperative equilibrium between state-parties. We
consider two case-scenarios. In the ﬁrst, parental investment and public investment are
strategic substitute in the ﬁght against upstream traﬃcking operations (& > 0), while in
the second, they are strategic complement (& < 0).
4.1. Properties of the Cooperative Equilibrium under Strategic
Substitutability: & > 0
The cooperative equilibrium is deﬁned as the solution of the minimization program
deﬁned in (63). Solving this optimization program yields a characterization of the main
feature of international coordination of national policy responses against child traﬃcking.
To uncover the properties of the cooperative equilibrium, we consider three types of
cooperation: (a) cooperation between poorer countries, (b) between richer countries, and
(c) between a richer country and a poorer one. We also normalize & to unity, i.e., & = 1.
4.1.1. Cooperation between Poorer Countries
Both countries are equally poor. This implies that they have a smaller stock of physical
capital: kA = kB = 1. This leads to the following expression for the global incidence of
child traﬃcking:
24
^ (A; B) =
X
i
24 i (1 + giu)  P (A; B)  1
P (A; B) + (1 + giu) [P (A; B)]
 2
 ai   i
35 : (64)
In this case, and in the absence of international coordination, any cross-country dif-
ferences in the incidence of child traﬃcking will be fully explained by cross-country diﬀer-
ences in the structure of the national action plans against child traﬃcking as determined
by the combination of shares (A; B). The problem of international coordination of
national action plans can thus be deﬁned as follows:
min
hA;Bi
^ (A; B)
To characterize the cooperative equilibrium, we simulate the model by assigning nu-
merical values to the relevant parameters. We select , , , , "u, and "d such that
condition (52) holds, which also implies that condition (50) will hold. Table 1 below
lists values for , , , , "u, and "d, and reports computed values for the coopera-
tive equilibrium’s policy pair, (A; B), and for the global incidence of child traﬃcking,
min ^ (:).
Table 1: Substitutability (& = 1): kA = kB = 1
    "u "d (A; B) min ^ (:)
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 1 (1; 1) 0.1064
Fig. 1 below plots the global incidence of child traﬃcking, ^ (A; B), for various
levels of the policy pair (A; B):
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Figure 1. Cooperation between poorer countries: Substitutability
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The following result can be derived from Fig. 1 above:
Result 1. When parental and government actions are strategic substitutes in the ﬁght
against the supply of traﬃcked children, the unique cooperative equilibrium between
two poorer countries involves both countries simultaneously attacking the supply of
child traﬃcking (i.e., (A; B) = (1; 1)).
For any two countries that are structurally similar, each one of them can be both a
source and a destination for traﬃcked children. Cooperation is beneﬁcial in this case,
simply because it corrects externalities arising from the transboundary nature of the
child traﬃcking phenomenon. Because both countries are equally poor, they have in
common a high incidence of child vulnerability to traﬃcking and a relatively low demand
for traﬃcked children. While a low demand may tend to make upstream child traf-
ﬁcking activities less proﬁtable, the high incidence of child vulnerability to traﬃcking,
however, will tend to raise the degree of proﬁtability of these upstream operations. As a
result, despite parents’ tendency to substitute private protection with public protection
of vulnerable children, specializing public resources in the ﬁght against upstream child
traﬃcking operations is the best pattern of cooperation between poorer countries, be-
cause it combines with a lower demand for traﬃcked children to reduce the proﬁtability
of upstream operations.
4.1.2. Cooperation between Richer Countries
Richer countries are those with a stock of capital kA = kB = 5. In that case, the
objective function for global incidence
^ (A; B) =
X
i
24 i (1 + giu)  P (A; B)  1
P (A; B) + 5 (1 + giu) [P (A; B)]
 2
 aik   ik
35
We maintain the values of the parameters , , , , "u, and "d as set in Table 1 above,
so that he minimization problem in (63) is well-deﬁned and condition (50) holds. Table
2 below reports the cooperative equilibrium policy pair, (A; B), as well as the global
incidence of child traﬃcking that is supported as the cooperative equilibrium:
Table 2: Substitutability (& = 1): kA = kB = 5
    "u "d (A; B) min ^ (:)
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 1 (1; 0) or (0; 1) 0.0358
Fig. 2 below plots the global incidence of child traﬃcking, ^ (A; B), for various
levels of the policy vector, (A; B).
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Figure 2. Cooperation between richer countries: Substitutability
The following results can be derived from inspection Fig. 2:
Result 2. When parental and government actions are strategic substitutes in the ﬁght
against the supply of traﬃcked children, cooperation between richer countries yields
two asymmetric equilibria. In each equilibrium, one country completely specializes
public intervention to the ﬁght against the supply of traﬃcked children while the
other specializes it to the ﬁght against the demand. (i.e., either (A; B) = (1; 0)
or (A; B) = (0; 1).
Here again, both countries are structurally similar. Cooperation in this case simply
corrects the cross-country externalities. This leads to a pattern of specialization charac-
terized by multiple equilibria. However, unlike the case of cooperation between poorer
countries, in this case, cooperation always leads to asymmetric national action plans.
4.1.3. Cooperation between Richer and Poorer Countries
In this subsection we consider a world made up of a poorer country and a richer one.
We want to know what happens to the properties of the cooperative equilibrium when
the economy of one of the states is poorer than the other. In our model, we posit that
country B is relatively poorer than country A: kB < kA.
We simulate the model in the same manner as above. We set kA = 5 and kB = 1.
We maintain the levels of , , , , "u, and "d used in the previous case, so that the
minimization problem in (63) is well-deﬁned and condition (50) holds. Table 3 lists the
values of these parameters, and also reports computed values for the policy actions’ pair
(A; B) as well as the global incidence of child traﬃcking, min ^ (:):
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Table 3: Substitutability (& = 1): kA = 5; kB = 1
    "u "d (A; B) min ^ (:)
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 1 (1; 0) 0.0476
The unique cooperative equilibrium features asymmetric national action plans:
(A; 

B) = (1; 0):
Fig. 3 below plots the global incidence of child traﬃcking against the policy pair
(A; B) when international cooperation to curb child traﬃcking involved a richer country
and a poorer one:
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Figure 3. Cooperation between rich and poor countries: Substitutability
The following result can be derived from inspection of Fig.3:
Result 3. In a world made up of a richer country and poorer one, the cooperative equi-
librium has the following properties: (i) specialization between the two states is
complete; (ii) the poorer state specializes its intervention on the upstream battle-
front to mitigate the supply of traﬃcked children (i.e., B = 1), while the richer
state focuses on the downstream battlefront to mitigate the demand for traﬃcked
children (i.e., A = 0).
Unlike in previous two cases where the two economies have an identical structure,
in this asymmetric case, one economy is richer (A) than the other (B). The supply
of traﬃcked children is higher in the poorer economy (B) while the demand for traf-
ﬁcked children is higher in the richer one (A). To the extent that child traﬃcking is a
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transboundary phenomenon, the high incidence of child vulnerability to traﬃcking in the
poorer country generates a negative externality in the ﬁght against demand in the richer
country while the high demand for traﬃcked children in the richer country generates a
negative externality in the ﬁght against supply in the poorer country. Therefore, inter-
national cooperation best internalizes these cross-country externalities by mandating a
pattern of complete specialization whereby the poorer country attacks the supply while
the richer country attacks the demand, despite the strategic substitutability.
The above results (1, 2, and 3) are obtained in the context where parental and govern-
ment actions in the upstream battlefront against child traﬃcking are strategic substitutes.
From an empirical point of view, however, it is not clear whether such substitutability is
supported by the data. Therefore, it might be of interest to ask what the properties of
the cooperative equilibrium would be if parental and government actions in the upstream
battlefront against child traﬃcking were strategic complements instead. We undertake
this task below.
4.2. Properties of the Cooperative Equilibrium under Strategic
Complementarities: & < 0
In this section, we explore the features of the cooperative equilibrium in the context
where public funds and parental resources are strategic complements in the ﬁght against
upstream child traﬃcking operations. From (12), this amounts to setting & < 0. We
specialize our analysis to the case where & =  1=2. As in the case with strategic sub-
stitutability, we consider three diﬀerent forms of cooperation: (a) between two poorer
countries, (b) between two equally rich countries, (c) between a richer country and a
poorer one.
4.2.1. Cooperation between Poorer Countries
As in the case with strategic substitutability, for poorer countries, we set kA = kB = 1.
We maintain all the other parameters at the same levels as in the substitutability case.
Table 4 below reports computed values for the policy pair (A; B) as well as the global
incidence of child traﬃcking, min ^ (:):
Table 4: Complementarity (& =  1=2): kA = kB = 1
    "u "d (A; B) min ^ (:)
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 1 (1; 1) 0.0827
Fig. 4 below is built using parameter values presented in Table 4, and plots the global
incidence of child traﬃcking against the policy pair, (A; B).
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Figure 4. Cooperation between poorer countries: Complementarity
The pattern of specialization is the same as in the case of substitutability: both
countries simultaneously attack the supply of child traﬃcking. I.e., (A; B) = (1; 1)
as can be seen from Fig. 4. However, the incidence of child traﬃcking is lower under
complementarity than under substitutability. (See Table 1 and Table 4).
4.2.2. Cooperation between Richer Countries
Here again we consider a world where both countries are richer, i.e., kA = kB = 5.
All other parameters are set at values identical to those of the substitutability case.
Table 5 below reports computed values for the policy pair, (A; B) ; as well as the global
incidence of child traﬃcking, min ^ (:):
Table 5: Complementarity (& =  1=2): kA = kB = 5
    "u "d (A; B) min ^ (:)
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 1 (1; 0);(0; 1) 0.0203
Like in the corresponding substitutability case, there are two cooperative asymmetric
equilibria: One where A specializes in the ﬁght against supply and B in the ﬁght against
demand (i.e., (A; B) = (1; 0)) and the other where it is the reverse (i.e., (A; B) =
(0; 1)). Fig.5 below plots the global incidence of child traﬃcking against the policy pair,
(A; B):
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Figure 5. Cooperation between richer countries: Complementarity
The two cooperative equilibria can be seen at each lower corner of the graph, corre-
sponding to the lowest global incidence of child traﬃcking. The only diﬀerence between
this case and the corresponding case under strategic substitutability pertains to the global
incidence of child traﬃcking. A comparison between Table 2 and Table 5 reveals that
the global incidence of child traﬃcking is lower under complementarity than under sub-
stitutability.
4.2.3. Cooperation with Asymmetric Countries
In this case scenario, we make country B relatively poorer that country A, which
in this model simply means, kB < kA. We set kA = 5 and kB = 1, and also maintain
all other parameters at their levels in Table 3. Table 6 below reports the cooperative
equilibrium, (A; B), as well as the global incidence of child traﬃcking—the outcome of
this cooperative equilibrium.
Table 6: Complementarity (& =  1=2): kA = 5; kB = 1
    "u "d (A; B) min ^ (:)
0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 1 1 (0; 1) 0.0198
Fig. 6 below illustrates the unicity of the cooperative equilibrium.
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Figure 6. Cooperation between between rich and poor countries: Complementarity
This result is analogous to the one obtain for the asymmetric case under the strategic
substitutability between public funds and parental resources in the ﬁght against child
vulnerability to traﬃcking. The only diﬀerence pertains to the global incidence of child
traﬃcking. Complementarity makes it lower than substitutability, but does not change
the pattern of specialization. Our analysis therefore suggests that the rational for inter-
national cooperation in the global ﬁght against child traﬃcking stems from the gain from
complete specialization of each state party.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a two-country general equilibrium model of child traﬃcking to
explore the pillars of international cooperation in the battle against transboundary child
traﬃcking. Our model highlights a triple line of defense against child traﬃcking, one
of which is privately funded while the other two are publicly funded. The ﬁrst line of
defense consists of parental investment in child protection against vulnerability to traf-
ﬁcking. We show that at this ﬁrst line of the battle against child traﬃcking, parental
wealth determines success. Vulnerable children are therefore those whose parents cannot
aﬀord to allocate household resources to child protection. This creates an incentive for the
government to set up two additional lines of defense: one designed to curb the traﬃckers
predatory attacks on vulnerable children (upstream battlefront) and another designed
to curb activities using traﬃcked children (downstream battle front). Because of the
transboundary nature of the market for traﬃcked children, in a market equilibrium, the
incidence of child traﬃcking in any country depends on domestic factors (including the
level of economic development and the government policy) as well as external factors (in-
cluding the level of economic development of and government policy in, foreign countries).
The goal of international cooperation is therefore to correct these cross-country ex-
ternalities while its object is the prescription of the share of public funds the government
of each cooperating country is to allocate to each of the two battlefronts. International
cooperation is formalized as a cooperative equilibrium, deﬁned as the policy actions’ pair
that minimizes the global incidence of child traﬃcking. We show that complete special-
ization between state parties is a central property of a cooperative equilibrium. We argue
that the pattern of specialization is unaﬀected by whether or not parental and govern-
ment investments are strategic complements in the ﬁght against the supply of traﬃcked
children. The only determinant of the pattern of specialization is the level of economic
development of state-parties. We show that specialization features asymmetric national
action plans when countries are structurally diﬀerent or when they are suﬃciently rich. In
particular, when countries are structurally diﬀerent, the unique cooperative equilibrium
exhibits a pattern of complete specialization whereby the government of the richer country
completely specializes its policy intervention on the demand for child traﬃcking within
its territory while the government of the poorer country completely specializes its policy
intervention on the supply of traﬃcked children from its territory. We conclude that in-
ternational organizations focusing on the elimination of child traﬃcking (e.g., UNICEF,
ILO) should emphasize a pattern of specialization featuring asymmetric national action
plans between richer and poorer countries.
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